



**OPCW**

**Technical Secretariat**

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**NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT**

**THE OPCW IN 2025: ENSURING A WORLD FREE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

The Director-General is pleased to circulate the attached paper, “The OPCW in 2025: Ensuring a World Free of Chemical Weapons”. The paper was prepared by the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) and builds on the outcomes of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and on views that have been expressed by States Parties during relevant discussions.

In order to consider what the Organisation should look like, and how best it can still fulfil the object and purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the future, it is important for both the Secretariat and States Parties to engage in forward-looking discussions on this issue. The Secretariat stands ready to fulfil its part in facilitating a constructive, coherent, inclusive, and transparent process.

The Director-General would like to encourage States Parties that are interested in any aspect of the paper to consult with others, and to bring forward their thoughts and views for consideration by the policy-making organs. The Secretariat stands ready to provide any assistance or support for the realisation of new projects.

Annex:           The OPCW in 2025: Ensuring a World Free of Chemical Weapons



## **Annex**

# **THE OPCW IN 2025: ENSURING A WORLD FREE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. The operating environment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will change significantly over the coming decade, during which declared chemical weapons stockpiles will be destroyed. To stay relevant, the focus of the Organisation's activities will progressively have to be shifted from disarmament of chemical weapons to preventing their re-emergence. This will require new investments in a widening range of activities related to verification, capacity development, stakeholder engagement, and governance of the Organisation, and also drawing on the lessons learned from the missions in the Syrian Arab Republic.
2. Verification to ensure continued confidence in compliance will remain at the heart of the Organisation's work. But its methods and practices will need to be adapted to changing realities. In addition to maintaining a viable industry verification regime and preparedness for non-routine inspections, greater emphasis will be placed on enhancing the Organisation's analytical capabilities.
3. Capacity development to prevent the misuse of chemistry and to foster its beneficial uses will continue to complement verification. National implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and assistance and protection measures against chemical weapons will remain core business in view of achieving these aims. In addition, efforts to enhance chemical security will gain in importance, requiring better coordination and the exchange of best practices.
4. Engaging a wider audience and broadening existing networks will help to extend the OPCW's reach. More effective engagement with other international organisations, the chemical industry, think tanks, academia, the scientific and technological community, and others should be directed at empowering broader participation in the Organisation's mission and leveraging the capabilities of others to achieve common goals.
5. To meet the above goals, the Organisation needs to adapt in order to remain fit for purpose. To this end, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") will develop further essential management and governance tools in a number of areas including administration, human resources, and information and computing technology (ICT). The resulting efficiencies and flexibility will increase the Organisation's ability to serve as a platform for States Parties and relevant stakeholders to promote the objective and purpose of the Convention.

## **INTRODUCTION: STAYING RELEVANT OVER THE COMING DECADE**

6. The OPCW derives its mandate from the Convention. Over the last 17 years, the Organisation has successfully served as the international security organisation charged with implementing the Convention, which is of unlimited duration.

7. This document is being issued in 2015, the year which marks the centenary of the first large-scale use of chemical weapons. It aims to set out an integrated vision and to develop a strategic direction for the Organisation, which will best serve the Organisation's character and purpose as a vehicle for enhancing global security, and which will enable it to consolidate the gains achieved in the century-long struggle against chemical weapons.
8. The security focus of the Convention and the ultimate beneficiary of the Organisation's work are spelled out in the preamble to the Convention, which states that States Parties are "[d]etermined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention".
9. Building on the Medium-Term Plan for the Period from 2015 to 2019 (EC-77/S/1 C-19/S/1, dated 23 April 2014), this document adopts a longer time horizon—to the year 2025—that goes beyond the currently anticipated end date of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. In so doing, it acknowledges the extended period that the transition process is likely to take. It also draws on other guidance documents in this process, such as the report of the Advisory Panel on future priorities of the Organisation (S/951/2011, dated 25 July 2011) and the final report of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Third Review Conference") (RC-3/3\*, dated 19 April 2013).
10. The missions in the Syrian Arab Republic provide important lessons to learn for the future of the Organisation. These range from the conduct at short notice of an investigation of use in adverse conditions, to the collaboration with the United Nations and other international organisations, to the in-depth involvement with a chemical demilitarisation programme. Identifying and learning lessons from these missions will help further increase the resilience of the Organisation and help it to continue to fulfil its mission under the Convention.
11. Based on the Convention, the Organisation's mission is formulated as follows:

As a treaty-based international organisation, the OPCW contributes to the disarmament of chemical weapons, to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, to providing assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and to facilitating the peaceful uses of chemistry through verification, capacity development, or engagement activities.
12. With the increasing achievement of results in the area of chemical weapons disarmament, preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons will assume greater importance in order for the Organisation to stay relevant over the coming decade. Accordingly, the vision to which the Organisation aspires for the year 2025 is to be "the premier international organisation working for a world free of chemical weapons, with a focus on preventing their re-emergence, by implementing all provisions of the Convention in an effective, efficient, and non-discriminatory manner."
13. While the focus of the Organisation's work has thus far been on the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, the security aspects of the Convention are more

- multifaceted, and also cover the prevention of, and protection against, the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Such a re-emergence could occur through the acquisition of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors. Consequently, the possible use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons is no longer confined to States. The relevant provisions of the Convention to prepare for and respond to chemical weapons attacks also apply to activities by non-State actors. The Organisation therefore has an important role in contributing to the global fight against terrorism.
14. In order to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, an effective industry verification regime will have to be sustained. This needs to be supported by the augmented data monitoring and transfer controls provided for in the Convention. In addition, full and effective national implementation of the Convention is vitally important for preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, as is the continued problem resolution and deterrent value of the provisions for consultation, cooperation, and fact-finding, including the capability to conduct non-routine verification activities such as challenge inspections and investigations of potential use at any point in time.
  15. Thus, taken together, preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons comprises a broader set of activities and results to be achieved than the current core objective of non-proliferation suggests. In fact, preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons cuts across all traditional results areas of the Organisation, and contains elements of verification, capacity development, improved national implementation, effective national protective programmes, engagement with relevant stakeholders through education and outreach activities, promotion of responsible use of science, the continued pursuit of universality, as well as the monitoring of relevant new developments in science and technology. Dependable results will require implementing activities in each of these areas in a coherent and systematic manner.
  16. These activities will need to be complemented by augmented or new capacities that build on the Organisation's knowledge and expertise, including helping to prevent the hostile use of chemicals, effectively responding to emergencies in line with the mandate set out in the Convention, and developing new partnerships with relevant institutions. Building such capacities will require a coordinated effort on the part of the Secretariat, Member States, and relevant stakeholders, especially international organisations (including UNODA,<sup>1</sup> UNOCHA,<sup>2</sup> the WHO,<sup>3</sup> the IAEA,<sup>4</sup> the CTBTO,<sup>5</sup> INTERPOL, UNICRI,<sup>6</sup> and others), the chemical industry, academia, and civil society.
  17. Achieving and measuring results in the area of chemical weapons demilitarisation has been a relatively straightforward undertaking, conducted in clearly identifiable programmatic areas. In contrast, given the complexity of a holistic approach to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, achieving and measuring results in

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<sup>1</sup> UNODA = the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> UNOCHA = the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> WHO = the World Health Organization.

<sup>4</sup> IAEA = the International Atomic Energy Agency.

<sup>5</sup> CTBTO = the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

<sup>6</sup> UNICRI = the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

this respect will be a far more complex task, cutting across the traditional programmatic areas of the Organisation. This will require sufficient flexibility for the adoption of additional new, project-based working methods and tools, including in areas such as results-based management (RBM), knowledge management, and ICT. A corresponding adaptation of the Secretariat could also be required in due course.

18. In order to be able to develop an integrated strategic direction for the Organisation, a number of assumptions have to be made about certain aspects of the Organisation's external environment in 2025 and its position in relation to this. These assumptions include that:
  - (a) The verified elimination of currently declared chemical weapons stockpiles will be completed by 2023, but the verified elimination of non-stockpile chemical weapons (abandoned and old chemical weapons) will continue.
  - (b) No significant issues will emerge in regard to suspicions concerning hitherto undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles, but new States Parties may join as chemical weapons possessor States.
  - (c) The use or threat of use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, especially terrorist groups, but also organised criminal groups and individuals, will represent a continuing concern, because knowledge about chemical weapons is in the public domain and available for any possible actor to misuse.
  - (d) Chemical weapons-related knowledge and expertise needs to be retained by the Organisation, combined with a rapidly deployable surge capacity in case of requests for CIs or IAUs, or to provide support for United Nations-led operations.
  - (e) Advances in science and technology will continue to evolve at an accelerated pace, driven by an increasing convergence of scientific disciplines, scientific collaboration at both national and international levels, and innovative funding strategies. Enabling technologies will be adopted into daily business and become operational across a broad range of industries and sectors—especially for chemical production and chemical disposal applications.
  - (f) New technologies will increasingly be integrated into routine use in the chemical industry, requiring the Secretariat to have familiarity with broader ranges of production equipment and processes.
  - (g) It will be important for the Organisation to fund new priorities in the areas of verification, capacity development, engagement, and organisational governance, despite financial constraints as currently experienced by several Member States.
  - (h) Completion of global chemical weapons disarmament will require that the Organisation re-prioritise the current seven core objectives in a way that is responsive to changing strategic circumstances, and with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

- (i) The Organisation is used as a platform for voluntary consultations and collaboration by Member States in order to advance the object and purpose of the Convention.

19. Reflecting the Organisation's growing emphasis on achieving tangible results, the following four sections discuss the areas of (i) verification, (ii) capacity development, (iii) engagement, and (iv) organisational issues.

#### **VERIFICATION FOR CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE**

20. Following the elimination of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, which is anticipated to be accomplished by 2023, the Organisation will need to continue to maintain the capacity to deal with non-stockpile-related issues, such as ongoing discoveries of old and abandoned chemical weapons, which will need to be destroyed in accordance with the Convention. In addition, there is also the possibility that one or more States may join the Convention as possessors of chemical weapons, and the threat of use of chemical weapons by States or non-State actors will remain. For these reasons, for the credibility of the Organisation it is essential to retain specialist knowledge and expertise in the chemical weapons field, in order to maintain a robust regime for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons or investigating any allegations of use of chemical weapons or other non-compliance concerns, and to provide technical assistance.

21. However, the Organisation will devote fewer resources to chemical weapons inspection-related activities as the destruction of currently declared stockpiles of chemical weapons nears completion. Approaching this major milestone provides the opportunity to re-examine the routine verification system of the Convention in order to adapt the Organisation's permanent mandate to changing circumstances. Emphasis will be placed on the following areas:

- (a) While the evaluation of declaration data and the conduct of inspections will remain an essential part of the Organisation's verification work, the Organisation will need to enhance its analytical capabilities, putting in place processes that are more robustly geared towards a process of gathering, validating, and evaluating information befitting an independent and more holistic assessment of how the treaty is implemented. Developing and maintaining such an analytical capability within the Secretariat will contribute to the goal of maintaining confidence in compliance. An augmented capability to use reliable publicly available information will form part of this process, which will build upon efforts already under way in conjunction with States Parties.

- (b) The Organisation will also require enhanced capabilities to monitor the full spectrum of relevant toxic chemicals falling within its mandate, ranging from toxic industrial chemicals to chemicals used for example in medicine or law enforcement, including those acting on the central nervous system. In this regard, developments in science and technology and relevant advice from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), as well as in-house scientific resources, will inform the Organisation's course of action.

22. Effective means and tools for consultation, cooperation, and fact finding will continue to be essential for addressing and resolving non-compliance concerns within the framework of the Convention. The Secretariat will accordingly need to maintain the resources, technical competence, operational readiness, and professional skills needed to facilitate consultation and cooperation, to conduct challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) or to provide support for United Nations-led investigations. To mitigate against any loss of chemical weapons-related knowledge and expertise, the Secretariat will develop new concepts, measures, and partnerships for how it can maintain readiness to conduct CIs and IAUs.
23. By the middle of the next decade—and before then, where achievable—the Organisation will have progressed its verification agenda to meet the following indicators of achievement:
  - (a) Complete, timely, and accurate declarations are submitted on a regular basis by 100% of the States Parties.
  - (b) A risk management system is established in a way that takes into account capacities in States Parties in the areas of chemical production, the degree to which Convention implementing legislation has been promulgated and is implemented, the scope and coverage of voluntary measures by relevant stakeholders, as well as science and technology advances.
  - (c) In line with the risk assessments undertaken, industry inspections are conducted in an effective, efficient, and consistent manner in relevant facilities, and with a balanced geographical distribution. Additionally, the Organisation has identified options for adapting the verification regime to changing risk patterns, including through dialogue with and among States Parties.
  - (d) The Organisation maintains the capacity and expertise to detect and respond in a resilient manner to possible chemical weapons exigencies, including break-out, use, new States Parties joining the Convention, CIs and IAUs, and issues related to abandoned and old chemical weapons. Options have been identified and developed to allow the Organisation to respond to more than one such exigency at a time.
  - (e) The Organisation has an ongoing, robust, and flexible system in place to review science and technology relevant to the Convention, based on work conducted by the Secretariat, the SAB, and States Parties in their own technical forums, with a view to inform policy making and implementation of the Convention.
  - (f) The Secretariat has augmented state-of-the-art methods and technologies for sampling and analysis at its disposal, and ensures that staff are trained in and aware of these, incorporating advice from the SAB and in consultation with the Secretariat's network of designated laboratories, including for the analysis of biomedical samples.

- (g) The Organisation has the necessary tools, procedures, and skilled and experienced staff in place to achieve indicators (a) to (f) above, including for data monitoring, analysis and interpretation, and independently verifying the accuracy and veracity of information received.

**CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT TO PREVENT THE HOSTILE USE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS AND TO FOSTER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

24. The Convention is a global instrument for ensuring security against chemical weapons, and several anticipated results in the area of capacity development—such as improving national implementation of the Convention and assistance and protection measures against chemical weapons—support this objective, including in relation to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and to dealing with the remnants of previous chemical weapons programmes and sea-dumped chemical weapons.
25. National implementation of the Convention remains a key pillar for the achievement of the Organisation's vision. The Organisation will augment its efforts to develop capacities in States Parties by tailoring innovative approaches that are responsive to the specific needs of States Parties. Building on the request by the Third Review Conference to provide the policy-making organs with a comprehensive and objective analysis of the status of national implementation, the Secretariat will consider developing a results-based evaluation and benchmarking system that could lead to the acknowledgement of standards of achievement and measures of progress in national implementation.
26. The Convention is also served, in a broader sense, by capacity development activities carried out by the Organisation, which are a mechanism to ensure the long-term engagement of States Parties that are politically committed to the Organisation, but for which the security benefits of the Convention are less immediate. The Organisation will therefore ensure that these activities are based on a needs assessment, are implemented in an effective, efficient, and sustainable manner, and create added value for the OPCW, so that the peaceful uses of chemistry continue to be promoted. Achieving results in this area will also focus on creating synergies with related initiatives by relevant national and international institutions to help enhance implementation of the Convention through the promotion of peaceful uses, while avoiding duplication of existing bilateral and multilateral activities.
27. Fostering international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of chemistry is an important goal of the Convention. Government policies are important in creating and maintaining a regulatory context that invites and accommodates scientific, technological, and economic development and exchanges. A key contribution that the Organisation makes in this regard is to help States Parties create and maintain regulatory frameworks that fully implement the Convention, thereby furthering conditions for economic development and international exchanges. The Organisation will improve its oversight of capacity development programmes by developing and deploying more tailored and reliable tools for assessing needs and programme results.
28. As the possible use of chemical weapons is no longer confined to States, the Organisation has an important role in contributing to the global fight against chemical



- terrorism. Based on the mandate of the Convention, the Organisation will therefore augment its in-house expertise in order to enhance capacity development activities in the area of prevention and response to the hostile release of toxic chemicals, including possible attacks on chemical installations and transportation infrastructure. As part of this, the Organisation will expand its networking with other international organisations in order to prepare for and respond to the hostile use of toxic chemicals. It will also increase its training support for the establishment of such capabilities in regions or subregions where they are lacking, and increase its engagement with regional centres—including the European Union CBRN<sup>7</sup> Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence—to address threats related to the hostile use of toxic chemicals.
29. The Secretariat has been providing technical assistance related to chemical security with a view to strengthening States Parties' capabilities. Future activities will be based on continuous engagement with States Parties and relevant stakeholders, to enhance understanding of the challenges they face, and to obtain feedback on their needs and requirements. The Organisation will augment its own capabilities in this area in order to facilitate the exchange of best practices, explore the science and technology dimensions of chemical security, catalyse international partnerships, and strengthen national capabilities by providing advice in cooperation with international players. Based on greater cooperation with the United Nations and international organisations and mechanisms, including those that have a counter-terrorism mandate, such as the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), such efforts will be pursued with a view to taking a lead role in the field of security risks associated with toxic chemicals.
30. By the middle of the next decade—and before then, where achievable—the Organisation will have progressed its capacity development agenda to meet the following indicators of achievement:
- (a) One hundred percent of States Parties have established a National Authority, with 70% of them having access to viable technical facilities that have been empowered through targeted capacity development to address priorities within national implementation of the Convention.
  - (b) Ninety percent of States Parties have enacted national legislation/administrative measures that cover all key areas of the Convention.
  - (c) At least one government training institution in each region has been identified that is capable and recognised by the OPCW to serve as a regional training centre on the Convention, in order to conduct targeted and tailor-made capacity development programmes that meet the needs of regions based on specific inputs from States Parties;
  - (d) An established and identifiable regional or subregional capacity exists to respond effectively to the use of chemical weapons or the accidental release of

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<sup>7</sup>

CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.

toxic chemicals, supported by trained OPCW operators and equipment resources made available by States Parties in the regions or subregions.

- (e) Seventy percent of States Parties have developed a viable and declarable national protective programme, which they report annually to the OPCW, with the support of OPCW needs assessments and, where required, training and capacity building;
- (f) There is an established capacity within the Secretariat to engage in a major international response to the hostile use of toxic chemicals, in cooperation with other international organisations, based on improved mechanisms for interoperability, an annual programme of exercises, and collaborative training that includes State Party participants.
- (g) A laboratory twinning programme that leverages training, mentorship, and equipment exchange between facilities in developed and developing economies has been established.
- (h) The Organisation has developed into a leading global platform for facilitating the exchange of best practices, catalysing international partnerships and standards, promoting national capabilities in the area of chemical security, and establishing a chemical security culture.

#### **ENGAGEMENT TO LEVERAGE OTHERS' CAPABILITIES**

- 31. The Organisation will pursue engagement activities and direct them towards three groups of actors. The first group comprises the few remaining States not Party to the Convention, in order to achieve universality. The second group includes relevant stakeholders in the chemical industry, academia, think tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and wider civil society. The third group includes other international organisations, groups, and mechanisms whose mandates overlap with that of the OPCW. The focus of engagement with the latter two groups will be on leveraging their capabilities in order to achieve common goals.
- 32. Achieving universal adherence to the Convention will remain a high priority to ensure the integrity and comprehensive reach of the Convention as a guarantor of global security against chemical weapons. Given the small number of remaining States not Party, the Organisation's universality efforts will be carefully tailored to better address the specific security, political, and governance considerations of these States. To this end, the Secretariat will liaise with States Parties and international organisations (including political-level representations), draw on the expertise of relevant stakeholders, and develop programmes that serve to enhance pro-Convention constituencies in States not Party.
- 33. Compliance with the requirements of the Convention cannot be achieved simply through a regulatory approach by national governments. It also requires the support and active collaboration of relevant stakeholders in the chemical industry, research, academia, NGOs, and civil society. The Organisation will work to broaden its community of stakeholders and augment its engagement through enhanced education and outreach efforts, such as those recommended by the SAB's temporary working

group on education and outreach. It will further develop effective networks and new partnerships with different stakeholder communities in order to leverage their expertise to help prepare responses to new implementation challenges as they emerge. Enhancing and properly resourcing education and outreach activities, including public diplomacy efforts, will be crucial in this respect.

34. The Organisation will augment its networking approach with other relevant international and regional organisations and mechanisms to identify synergies in the activities carried out in cooperation with them. This will include, but will not be limited to, organisations and mechanisms with a similar verification mandate, such as the CTBTO and the IAEA. Areas for broader and deeper engagement are many, ranging from capacity development to non-routine verification activities.
35. By the middle of the next decade—and before then, where achievable—the Organisation will have progressed its engagement agenda to meet the following indicators of achievement:
  - (a) Membership of the Organisation has increased, leading to a further entrenchment of the Convention as a universally accepted global norm against the hostile use of toxic chemicals.
  - (b) Promoting responsible science through appropriate means, including interaction with national and international scientific societies, is considered an important element of implementing the Convention, and has been adopted as a priority by States Parties in their national school and university curricula.
  - (c) A formal network of cooperation with the science and technology community of relevance to the Convention, especially scientific societies, has been established, and is supported by a broad-based education and outreach programme.
  - (d) The Organisation has further institutionalised its relationship with the chemical industry globally, through proactive engagement and common projects in support of the Convention.
  - (e) Relationships with international organisations and mechanisms have been enhanced, and their capabilities leveraged to achieve common goals in support of implementing the Convention.
  - (f) The Organisation holds a major biannual engagement event to draw on the knowledge and expertise of NGOs, think tanks, academia, the science and technology community, and the chemical industry to further the object and purpose of the Convention.

#### **AN ORGANISATION THAT REMAINS FIT FOR PURPOSE**

36. Recalibrating the priority and resources allocated to the core objectives of the Organisation will require it to evolve to remain fit for purpose. Adapting to changing circumstances will enable the Organisation to demonstrate its continued relevance. The Convention provides sufficient flexibility for this through policy development,

decision making by the policy-making organs, and gradual modifications of work and operational practices, although more will need to be done to improve creativity and responsiveness. In order to achieve as large a buy-in as possible for the transition, the Organisation will make full use of principles like inclusive consultation, transparency, non-discrimination, and consensus building.

37. The working methods of the Organisation will also require adjustments to respond to the changes set out above, and this may include adjustments to the structure of the Secretariat. In the light of these changes, the Secretariat will explore how its structure can be adjusted to enable the adoption of a more project-driven approach, which preserves and makes full use of its technical expertise in achieving results in the areas of verification, capacity development, and engagement. Breaking down silos and designating staff in all units for project-related work on cross-cutting issues, while fully respecting the confidentiality requirements of the Convention, will enable the Secretariat to do this in a more effective, flexible, and resilient manner, creating in the process new synergies that will also benefit non-project-related work.
38. In addition, the Secretariat will augment its capabilities to serve as a platform for the deliberation of issues related to the object and purpose of the Convention, which are of interest to a subset of States Parties. In its role as convenor, the Secretariat will seek to be inclusive, establish a neutral space to ensure an impartial process, overcome institutional impediments, and arrive at action and implementation plans that further strengthen the Convention. Issues that may benefit from such an approach include, but are not limited to, codes of conduct, central nervous system-acting toxic chemicals, sea-dumped chemical weapons, and aspects of capacity development.
39. Essential management and governance tools will be further developed in the following four areas, in order to support the Organisation's transition process and to achieve results focused on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons:
  - (a) The Organisation's use of augmented RBM capabilities will provide a structured approach to its planning, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting on progress, in relation to the transition itself and to achieving results in the Organisation's substantive areas of work.
  - (b) The Secretariat will develop the tools and processes and flexibility in problem solving required to increase its resilience and adaptive capacity to deal with new challenges that continue to arise in relation to the implementation of the Convention.
  - (c) The Organisation will keep abreast of new science and technology developments and identify enabling technologies, and integrate these technologies into use as appropriate. Likewise, the Secretariat will ensure that technical staff are kept abreast of changes in the chemical sciences, technology, and industrial applications, in order to maintain readiness to respond to unexpected circumstances.
  - (d) The Secretariat will augment its knowledge management capabilities through improved knowledge retention and transfer processes and practices, so that it

will be able to remain the repository of knowledge and expertise on Convention implementation-related issues.

40. ICT is a further enabler across all result areas of the Organisation. An upgraded ICT infrastructure within the Secretariat, including an integrated enterprise content management (ECM) system—in combination with the above-mentioned practices and processes—will serve as the enabling platform for the Organisation’s augmented knowledge management capabilities. Additional ICT tools and support will be acquired, as appropriate, to increase efficiencies in and the effectiveness of results achievement in both the Organisation’s verification and capacity-development mandates.
41. Having the right human resources will remain essential to the Organisation’s continued success. Increasing analytical capabilities as part of the Organisation’s verification mandate, as well as augmenting capacity development efforts with strengthened evaluation capabilities, will require additional human resources in these areas. In addition, increasing the flexibility and adaptive capacity of staff to deal with changing requirements will necessitate the expansion of training activities to enable a multi-skilled workforce. While maintaining its character as a non-career organisation, the OPCW may, during the latter stages of its transition process, revisit the modalities of its tenure policy.
42. In support of achieving results and ensuring that programme and project outputs and outcomes are achieved in a predictable manner, the Organisation will also explore the benefits to be derived from moving to a two-year budget cycle.
43. By the middle of the next decade—and before then, where achievable—the Organisation will have progressed its organisational governance agenda to meet the following indicators of achievement:
  - (a) The Organisation has consolidated administrative functions throughout the Secretariat, including potential third-party delivery (through outsourcing or shared services). In addition, administrative/back-office processes are streamlined through the implementation of a new enterprise-resource-planning (ERP) system, realising increased efficiencies through automation in several administrative functions. In that connection, the Secretariat will explore the viability of a paperless office and conference environment.
  - (b) Robust and up-to-date ICT systems are in place to enable fully electronic declaration and verification processes, including “smart” analysis, leading to tightly targeted inspection/mission engagements. The extension of the ERP/enterprise content management (ECM) paradigm will include secured remote access to data on the Security Critical Network (SCN) and Security Non-Critical Network (SNCN), as well as flexible deployment of skilled staffing.
  - (c) The Organisation continues to be a leading employer among international organisations, promoting its core values in attracting and retaining the highest calibre human resources. The shift toward project-based and matrix management approaches is matched by corresponding staffing and employee

skills, and is based on a comprehensive knowledge management strategy that goes beyond document management and institutional memory capture.

- (d) Sound ICT, knowledge management, human resources, and risk management strategies are in place, and regularly updated, and geared towards the full implementation of RBM.
- (e) Secretariat capabilities to convene on issues of interest to ad hoc groups of States Parties are developed to ensure results-oriented and smooth deliberative processes on such issues.

## CONCLUSION

- 44. The Secretariat submits this paper to the States Parties for their consideration so that the Organisation can continue to build on the successes of Convention implementation since 1997. Based on the knowledge and expertise acquired, the Organisation needs to start a transition process that will allow it to remain a multilateral security instrument that responds to, and is seen to respond to, the evolution of its strategic context. States Parties' contributions to this process are invited and will be crucial to its success.
- 45. In order to continue achieving the goals of the Convention, the transition process will require that the Organisation's verification system be further developed to enhance its monitoring and analytical capabilities while retaining core expertise, and that its capacity development and engagement efforts be strengthened through enhanced capacities to analyse and respond to the implementation needs of States Parties. Combined with the improvements in organisational governance outlined above, this will enable the Organisation to remain fit for purpose, and to lead the way in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
- 46. Two sessions of the Conference of the States Parties to review the operation of the Convention will take place during the period covered by this paper, namely in 2018 and 2023 respectively. Any strategic guidance emanating from these Conferences will be reviewed with a view to updating this vision of the future of the Organisation.

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