

Editorial

The EU, the OPCW and the future of the CWC

The Twentieth Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be held in The Hague from 30 November to 4 December 2015. Among the many challenges to the OPCW and to the States parties to the Treaty, the future of the CWC is one that the Organization has been put on its agenda for several years, as the post-chemical weapons destruction stage is approaching. In particular, the March 2015 OPCW note titled «The OPCW in 2025: ensuring a world free of chemical weapons» (document S/1252/2015) shall be examined during the Conference.

As a regular contributor to the OPCW activities (six voluntary contributions have been made by the EU to the OPCW since 2005, the latest being Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP for the years 2015-2017 adopted on 17 February 2015), the EU has a role to play in the recent debate about the future of the Treaty.

While focusing on the traditional priorities, which are also among the OPCW priorities, such as completing the destruction of existing stockpiles or promoting universality (the number of States parties is currently 192), the EU and its Member States have launched a reflection on the future relevancy of the chemical weapons prohibition regime.

The re-emergence of chemical weapons, their use by non-state actors and terrorists, convergence with biology, or the future effectiveness of the Convention in an evolving strategic context are elements of this new debate. It has to be pursued not only within the OPCW competent organs but also between States parties to the Treaty. Particularly among its more ardent supporters.

*Benjamin Hautecouverture
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
/ Fondation pour la recherche
stratégique (FRS)*

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The risk of proliferation is perceived as an obstacle to disarmament

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The Humanitarian Initiative has changed the dynamics of the discussion on nuclear weapons and identified a legal gap that should be addressed.



Camilla Waszink is Programme Director for The International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI)'s Arms and Disarmament Programme. She has worked on disarmament, arms control and humanitarian affairs for the past 15 years, including for the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre and the Small Arms Survey. She holds an MA in international policy from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

ILPI has recently joined our Consortium's network. How do you perceive the usefulness of European civil society networking in the field of international security?

ILPI is an organisation that operates at the intersection of research, legal analysis and policy. We aim to ensure that the research and analysis we provide will be relevant for and used by policymakers. From this perspective, networking is most useful to the extent that it can contribute to building a shared agenda of work, not only in terms of research, but also for the purpose of influencing policy development. A tremendous amount of knowledge and expertise resides in civil society organisations, but it is a challenge to coordinate efforts, build a cumulative evidence base to inform policy on security issues, and ensure that this reaches the right decision-makers. This is all the more relevant in our age of information overload where policymakers are inundated with analysis and advice from a large number of more or less credible sources. We therefore find it important to be able to participate in a network that facilitates dialogue and cooperation among key actors in the European research and policy community on issues of international security. And we also believe this is useful for our work to reach a wider audience among European decision-makers and civil society.

The ILPI WMD project seems to be very much focused on nuclear

disarmament. To what extent do you think the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the E3/EU+3 and Iran can support the disarmament process?

As long as there is a risk of proliferation, it will be perceived as an obstacle to disarmament. By addressing the main proliferation concern of recent years, the Iran agreement could thus remove a key argument against further arms reductions. The process has also shown that the nuclear-weapon states are able and willing to come together to find diplomatic solutions. If this has served to build trust, it might positively influence the prospects for progress on nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, the Iran case has highlighted some of the obvious shortcomings of the existing control regime, including the need to make the IAEA Additional Protocol universally applicable. To prevent cheating, all states must accept the same level of transparency and inspections. Secondly, non-proliferation will remain a challenge as long as some states maintain a right to keep these weapons. As was declared in Vienna last year, there is a legal gap with regards to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The fact that 119 states have committed to the Humanitarian Pledge with a view to filling this gap appears to be one of the most promising avenues for further progress towards elimination of nuclear weapons at the moment.

How to overcome the longstanding deadlock at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in order to eventually launch a negotiating process for a future FMCT?

It will be difficult to break the deadlock in the CD as long as its members fundamentally disagree on its aims and priorities and decision-making is done by consensus. As concluded by UNIDIR, it is not an absence of political will that hinders progress, but the fact that there are opposing political wills. Again, I would like to highlight the Humanitarian Initiative as an attempt to change the dynamic of discussions on nuclear weapons. When Norway launched this by hosting a conference in Oslo in 2013, the aim was to initiate a facts-based discussion about the humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons. Through three conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria, the initiative has succeeded in framing the nuclear weapon issue in a way that moves it away from the usual security paradigm, and the politicized discourse that has prevailed in the CD and other forums where nuclear weapons are discussed. It has also opened the issue up to a broader group of States, international organisations and civil society. By bringing in new thinking and new players, this initiative can hopefully contribute to progress also in existing forums, both on an FMCT and on disarmament.

*Interview conducted by
Benjamin Hautecouverture*

EU Institutional news

The EU support to the CTBTO

On 12 October 2015, the Council of the EU adopted a new decision in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). As such, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 is the sixth European action since 2006, bringing the total amount of EU voluntary contributions to around 19 million euros.

The new Council Decision provides support to the CTBT verification regime in three main areas: Sustaining the International Monitoring System (IMS) Network, upgrading on-site inspection capabilities, outreach and country-level capacity building.

CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo emphasized the fact that “without the European Union’s support we could not have reached the current well-advanced status in the build-up and operational capabilities of the CTBT verification regime. This includes the EU’s help to developing countries to build capacities in CTBT verification technologies, thus getting buy-in from these countries into the world’s largest and most sophisticated multilateral verification system (...).”

It is worth noting that all 28 EU Member States have signed and ratified the CTBT. Besides, the EU Member States’ contributions amount to around 40% of the CTBTO’s budget.

[COUNCIL DECISION \(CFSP\) 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015](#) on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

[Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction \(2015/I\)](#), 20 July 2015.

The EU at the OPCW

The 80th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was held in The Hague on 6 October 2015. On this occasion, Mr. Ambassador Pierre-Louis Lorenz (Luxembourg) gave a statement on behalf of the European Union, in which the main European positions vis-à-vis the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the OPCW were recalled.

On the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, while there is mounting evidence that chemicals continue to be used as weapons of war as stated by the reports of the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), the EU welcomes UNSC Resolution 2209 condemning the use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria. According to the statement, “chlorine has been dropped from helicopters, an asset that only the Syrian government possesses.” Besides, the EU expresses its concern about the “insufficient information provided by the Syrian government” regarding many outstanding issues, such as the lack of original documentation, undeclared R&D facilities, questions about a ricin programme, etc. Whereas Syria acceded to the CWC in October 2013, many concerns remain which could undermine the authority of the chemical prohibition norm. According to the EU, “it is time for the Syrian Arab Republic to face its responsibilities”, including its financial responsibilities.

As regard to the EU support to the OPCW, it is worth noting that the EU Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP for the years 2015-2017,

which was adopted on 17 February 2015, made available to the OPCW some 2.5 million EUR to support various activities such as promoting universality, national implementation, international cooperation, the Africa Programme and implementing lessons learned from the Syrian operation. This Council Decision was the sixth voluntary contribution of the EU to OPCW activities since 2005. Besides, the EU has continued supporting the OPCW for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons programme during the first half of 2015. It did so by extending the validity of the Decision to contribute from the IcSP 12 million EUR to the OPCW Trust Fund.

The future of the OPCW was also raised by the EU, stating that the EU and its Member States have started a reflection to discern the post-CW destruction stage. According to the latest progress report on the implementation of the 2003 EU Strategy, the future relevancy of the CWC is deeply linked with the re-emergence of chemical weapons, chemical use by non-state actors and terrorists, and convergence with biology, inter alia. The EU statement to the Executive council adds the importance of an adequate verification regime, “including investigations of alleged use and challenge inspections”.

[Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. Pierre-Louis Lorenz \(Luxembourg\) at the 18th session of the OPCW Executive Council, The Hague, October 6, 2015](#)

Upcoming events

November 16-18, 2015: [Forty-Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO](#)

November 26 - 27, 2015: IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna

November 30 - December 04, 2015: [14th meeting of the States parties to the Ottawa convention, Geneva](#)

November 30 - December 04, 2015: [20th Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention \(CWC\), World Forum Convention Centre, The Hague](#)

March 29-30, 2016: [Nuclear Industry Summit 2016](#), the Grand Hyatt Washington, Washington, D.C.

March 31-April 1, 2016: [Fourth Nuclear Security Summit \(NSS\)](#), the Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C.

Network News

Publications and web resources

[Advancing disarmament verification tools: a task for Europe?](#) By Malte Götttsche, Moritz Kütt, Götz Neuneck, and Irmgard Niemeyer, NP Paper No.47, October 2015, 18pp.

[Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks](#), Caroline Baylon, David Livingstone, Roger Brunt, Chatham House report, 5 October, 2015.

[Ambiguous ambitions: The saga of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international legal framework regulating weapons of mass destruction](#), Reza Lahidji, Background paper No.17/2015, September 2015, International Law and Policy Institute.

[The 2015 UN Register on Conventional Arms: still time to improve](#), Pieter Wezeman, Siemon Wezeman, Expert comments, 18 September 2015, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

[Iran – An Experiment in Strategic Risk-Taking](#), Bruno Tertrais, Politics and strategy, The Survival Editors' Blog, 16 September 2015

[Iran – A Good Deal](#), Mark Fitzpatrick, Politics and strategy, The Survival Editors' Blog, 10 September 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[How Obama Beat Congress on Iran](#), Timothy Stafford, RUSI Analysis, 2 September 2015, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

[The European Parliament and the external dimension of the EU Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy in The European Parliament and its International Relations](#), Clara Portela, Routledge, 2015, 109-120pp.

[The New Nuclear Forensics – Analysis of Nuclear Materials for Security Purposes](#), Vitaly Fedchenko (ed), Oxford University Press, 13 August 2015, 320pp. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

[UK Ballistic-Missile Defence – drivers and options](#), Peter Roberts, Occasional Paper, 31pp., 14 August 2015, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

The DIIS “Governing Uranium project” presented in Paris



The uranium industry is shifting as new suppliers (such as Malawi and Tanzania) and consumers (India and Iran) are entering the global uranium market. These new entrants introduce new challenges for export controls, transport security, physical protection and tracking of materials. At the same time, technological advances are producing a purer product, prompting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to re-clarify where in the nuclear fuel cycle nuclear material accountability begins, thereby capturing more and more of the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle under international safeguards. The “Governing Uranium project”, led by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), is a global research effort studying how a changing international market is impacting the governance of uranium production and trade.

On 24 September 2015, Cindy Vestergaard, Senior researcher, presented the project’s final report at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS, Paris). Bringing together up to 25 researchers coming from 10 countries, the “Governing Uranium project” analyses how uranium trade is governed across fifteen uranium producing and consuming countries, representing eighty-five per cent of global uranium production and seventy per cent of consumption. The project gives focus on security, safeguards, and industry practices that govern natural uranium production and trade (up to the point of conversion).

Dr. Vestergaard explained how a shifting market is impacting industry and the policy implications for nuclear trade. She detailed the list of 9 policy recommendations which concludes the report. Among these recommendations, the report calls for a comprehensive approach to uranium security, more interaction between the industry and governments to encourage a real nuclear security dialogue and to develop a nuclear security culture at national level, inter alia.

A newcomer to the Consortium network

In September 2015, the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) joined the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, being the third think tank from the Czech Republic to take part in our network of European independent think tanks specialized in international security and strategic matters.

The Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) is a non-profit, non-governmental public policy organization established in early 2002. PSSI’s mission is to build an ever-growing group of informed and security-minded policy practitioners dedicated to the development and safeguarding of democratic institutions and values in the Czech Republic, other post-communist states and beyond. PSSI offers programs that equip new generations of young leaders with the skills to manage the complex, security-related challenges of the 21st century.

To fulfill its mission, PSSI conducts a range of educational activities under its Security Scholars Program, Space Security Program, Economic and Financial Statecraft Program and Energy Security Program. PSSI aims to identify and analyze less understood foreign policy and security policy issues/developments involving Europe, the U.S. and other theaters of the world, and to propose sound, achievable policy prescriptions to address these and other security concerns. Its foremost interest remains, however, preserving and expanding the hard-fought freedoms of the Czech Republic and other post-communist states.

Upcoming events

October 27 - 29, 2015: India’s Role in Global Nuclear Governance, IDSA-PRIO Workshop, Oslo (by invitation only)

October 30 – November 01, 2015: [The IISS Manama Dialogue 2015](#)

November 2, 2015: [Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Testing](#), Chatham House workshop, London (by invitation only)

November 11 - 12, 2015: [Fourth EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament conference](#), Brussels (by invitation)

December 14, 2015: [Nuclear non-proliferation: planning for 2020](#), Wilton Park conference (WP 1414), Wiston House, UK

December 14, 2015: [Nuclear strategy in the cyber age: new challenges for the ultimate weapon](#), University of Birmingham, Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, Dr Andrew Futter (University of Leicester)

[The Governing Uranium project](#)

[Governing Uranium -From uranium mining to conversion](#), Cindy Vestergaard, DIIS Report, 28 August 2015

[Prague Security Studies Institute](#)

Spotlight on...

Latest publications

Reza Lahidji, [Ambiguous ambitions - The saga of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international legal framework regulating weapons of mass destruction](#), Background Paper No 17/2015, September 2015

Torbjørn Graff Hugo, [Nordic refreshments](#), The WMD Blog, August 2015

Kjølv Egeland, [The fairness dimension](#), The WMD Blog, 10 August 2015

Magnus Løvold, [Now what, NPT?](#) Panel discussions, 18 June 2015

Kjølv Egeland, [Longing for Armageddon](#), Background Papers, June 2015

Kjølv Egeland and Nobuo Hayashi, [The NPT disarmament fallacy](#), The WMD Blog, May 2015

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Editor: EU Non-proliferation Consortium

Publication director:

Camille Grand

Editor in chief:

Benjamin Hautecouverture

Headquarters:

4 bis, rue des Pâtures, 75016 Paris, France

Tel: 00 33 1 43 13 77 61

Fax: 00 33 1 43 13 77 78

The International Law and Policy Institute



INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE

The [International Law and Policy Institute](#) (ILPI) provides analytical work, juridical briefs, and policy advice within international law, human rights, corporate social responsibility, governance, and country/conflict analysis. ILPI is established with the conviction that the combination of academic excellence and operational policy experience facilitates “hands-on” solutions and the ability to handle complex processes and issues. ILPI is based in Oslo, Norway, but has an extensive network of partners worldwide.

ILPI has extensive competence in identifying and analyzing humanitarian, developmental and legal challenges related to weapons and their use. Our experience includes the development and implementation of policies, programmes and legal frameworks at international and domestic levels.

The team

Torbjørn Graff Hugo holds an M.Phil. in Peace and Conflict Studies and a BA in International Studies from the University of Oslo. He has worked and studied in a range of different countries, including Sri Lanka, Kenya, France, Spain, Japan and the USA. Before joining ILPI, Hugo worked in the Section for Disarmament and Non-proliferation in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. Hugo has extensive practical and theoretical experience in the field of nuclear disarmament, including from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations in New York. For the past three years he has been attached to ILPI's Nuclear Weapons Project, and since January 2014 as project coordinator.

Magnus Løvold holds an M.Phil in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Oslo. He has worked and studied in various European countries, including France, United Kingdom and Switzerland. Before joining ILPI, Løvold was the Campaign and Advocacy Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in Geneva. Løvold has extensive practical experience in the field of nuclear disarmament, and have recently focused his work around the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Since January 2015, he has been attached to ILPI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Project.

Gro Nystuen is dr. juris and has worked in the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 2005. From 1995 to 1997 she was seconded to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the High Representative in connection with the peace settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and throughout 1999 to the UN Special Envoy for the Balkans. From 2005 she was Associate Professor of International Humanitarian Law/the Law on Armed Conflict at the University of Oslo and from 2008 also Associate Professor at the Defence Staff University College in Oslo. In addition to a number of topics covered by public international law and treaty law in general, she has worked in particular with

human rights, international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict, disarmament law and arms control law, arms export control law, constitutional law, peace agreements, international criminal law, penal law and procedural law, and corporate social responsibility. Nystuen is also an expert on international/multilateral legal procedure for international conferences and negotiation processes within the UN as well as other international fora. She has published extensively on the above issues. From 2009, she has been Senior Partner at ILPI and from June 2013 she has also been Director of ILPI Centre for International Humanitarian Law.

Camilla Waszink has 15 years of experience in the areas of humanitarian affairs, security, peace and conflict. She has previously worked as project manager in the Norwegian Red Cross and senior advisor at the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF). Between 2002 and 2009, she was policy adviser in the Arms Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, where she worked on a range of weapons and international humanitarian law issues, including international regulation of arms transfers, small arms availability and landmines. She has also worked as a researcher and consultant, including for the Small Arms Survey and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and the Program on Security and Development at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Waszink has experience from a range of multilateral disarmament and arms control processes, and has coordinated large institutional projects and strategic processes. She has published extensively on arms control and international humanitarian law, protection of civilians, armed violence, post-conflict disarmament and weapons management in peace processes. Waszink holds an MA in international policy from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a BA in political science and law from the University of Oslo. She has worked/studied in the US, Switzerland, Spain, France, Germany and Sweden. Waszink is ILPI's Programme Director for Arms & Disarmament.